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ABSTRACT
Important tederal and state legislation, state court
decisions, and regulatory agency programs support
increased public access to shorelines and beaches, both
publicly and privately owned. This paper examines
alternative theories and approaches for increasing public
access, especially the difficult taking issues presented
where private property is involved. Techniques for
reducing the significance of the taking issue are
suggested.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Terminology and Definitions
1. "Shoreline": Bank or fast land adjacent to
freshwater lake or river above ordinary high-water mark
defined as the line up to which the presence and action
of the water is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark
either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation,
or other easily recognized characteristics. Lawrence v. 
American W.P. Co., 144 Wis. 556, 562, 128 N.W. 440
(1910).
2. "Beach": Land above the mean-high tide line
adjacent to ocean waters.
3. "Public": Recreational users who are neither
owners of land immediately adjacent to the freshwater
body (riparians), nor the licensees or invitees of such
riparians.
B. Thesis: The judicial, legislative, and regulatory
theories, policies, and approaches used to expand public
access rights to ocean beaches suggest a similar
expansion of public access rights to freshwater
shorelines. However, greater difficulties with the
taking issue will be confronted in expanding public
freshwater shoreline access rights, especially where the
shoreline is privately owned as is typically the case.
Thus techniques for reducing the taking issue's
significance are suggested which both enhance public
access and reduce shoreline property owners' concerns.
C. State and Federal Constitutional and Legislative
Policy Supports Public Access to Beaches and
Shorelines. See, e.g., California Constitution Article
X, section 4: "No individual, partnership, or
corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage or tidal
lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable
water . . . shall . . . exclude the right of way to such
water . . . so that access to the navigable waters of
this State shall be always attainable for the people
thereof"; Hawaii Revised Statutes § 205A-21: "The
legislature finds that special controls on development
within an area along the shoreline are necessary . . . to
insure that adequate access, by dedication or other
means, to publicly owned or used beaches, recreation
areas, and natural reserves is provided"; federal Coastal
Zone Management Act section 305(b)(7), 16 U.S.C. §
1454(b)(7), which requires federally approved and funded
state coastal zone management programs to have "a
planning process for the protection of . . . access to
public beaches and other public coastal areas." Cf. the
federal Coastal Barriers Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3501
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et. seq., which removes most federal subsidies for
development on designated undeveloped barrier islands,
discussed in Bostic v. United States, 753 F.2d 1292 (4th
Cit. 1985). The apparent legislative policy judgment is
that public water-oriented recreational interests
outweigh private property interests in case of conflict.
D. However, To Date the Courts Have Enlarged Public
Rights to Use Fresh Waters (as Discussed in Another
Paper) Without Significantly Increasing Public Rights to
Use Adjacent Shorelines.
1. Examples of judicial expansion of public water
use rights: Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261,
145 N.W. 816 (1914) (hunting on "navigable waters"
(broadly defined) is lawful when they are in a navigable
stage between the ordinary high-water marks); Day v. 
Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (1961) (recognizes public right
to float "nonnavigable" river whose bed was privately
owned, including a right when necessary to disembark and
walk or wade upon submerged lands in order to pull, push,
or carry floating craft over shallows, ripples, rapids or
obstructions but not including unrestricted walking or
wading on the river's bed or channel); Montana Coalition 
for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 and v.
Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1984) (based on
public trust doctrine and 1972 Montana Constitution,
court finds a public right to use recreationally
navigable streams up to the ordinary high-water mark and
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a right to portage across private property to bypass
barriers in the water, but no right to cross private
property to reach the water; portage rights were
subsequently regulated by the Montana legislature in H.B.
265, 49th Legislature 1985); State v. Red River Valley 
Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945) (public has right
to fish on a reservoir the bed of which is privately
owned); Buffalo River Conservation and Recreation Council 
v. National Park Service, 558 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1977)
(public rights to use river obtained by prescription);
State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark. 227, 595 S.W. 2d 685, cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 124 (1980) (river classified as
"navigable" based on recreational canoe use thereby
creating public rights to use the river); Hitchinqs v. 
Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park District, 55 Cal. App. 3d
560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976) (stream need not be
navigable year round to meet recreational navigability
test). See also Muench v. Public Service Commission, 261
Wis. 492, 53 NW. 2d 514 (1952) (by state statute public
recreational rights must be considered in state dam
permit proceedings); Cal. Const. Art. I, § 25 (declaring
public right to fish upon waters of the state); Minn.
Stat. Ann § 105.38(1) (declaring all waters capable of
public use to be public); 1987 Ore. S.B. 38 requiring
shoreline owners to build and maintain a portage around
barriers they erect and authorizing the public to portage
around such barriers); Restatement of Torts 2d 3 193 (a
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person is privileged to navigate in a reasonable manner
"navigable waters" situated on land in the possession of
another). But see People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 597
P.2d 1025 (1979) (trespassing conviction of canoeist
using nonnavigable stream whose bed was owned by adjacent
landowners upheld despite provision in state constitution
that unappropriated water of every natural stream is the
people's property; according to J. Sax & R. Abrams, Legal
Control of Water Resources 66 (1986), Emmert has been
narrowly construed by the Colorado Attorney General);
Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 P. 685 (1905)
(statute providing for public right to fish in any stream
in the state subject to actions in trespass for any
damage done along the banks held unconstitutional);
Bergen Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Barnes, 683 P.2d 365
(Colo. App. 1984) (bed owner controls water surface use);
Bott v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 415
Mich. 45, 327 N.W. 2d 838 (1982) (public water use rights
based on recreational usability rejected). Compare
People ex. rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 96 Cal.
App. 3d. 403, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1979) (county may not
ban all rafting and boating on a section of "navigable"
river highly suited to such use) and State v. San Luis 
Obispo Sportsman's Ass'n, 22 C.A. 3d 440, 584 P.2d 1088,
149 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1978) (constitutionally declared
public right to fish extends to all state-owned land not
being used for a special purpose incompatible with public
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use), with State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 338 N.W.2d
492 (1983) (state may limit installation of ski jumps in
"navigable" lake to riparian owners without violating the
public trust doctrine), Westervelt v. Natural Resources 
Comm'n, 402 Mich. 412, 263 N.W.2d 564 (1978) (agency
rules limiting canoeing activity upheld), and 1987 Ore.
S.B. 38 (authorizes State Marine Board to regulate water
ski course markers and ski jumps). See generally Marvel,
Public Rights of Recreational Boating, Fishing, Wading, 
or the Like In Inland Stream the Bed of Which is 
Privately Owned, 6 ALR 4th 1030 (1981); Note,
Recreational Rights in Public Water Overlying Private 
Property, 8 Ut. L. Rev. 301 (1983); Oregon Division of
State Lands, Report and Recommendation on the Navigable
Waters of Oregon (1983).
2. In order to exercise public rights to use
freshwater bodies, the public must be able to reach the
water, but the cases have not been nearly so sympathetic
to assertions of public rights to cross private lands to
get to water bodies in which public rights exist: Pigorsh 
v. Fahner, 386 Mich. 508, 194 N.W. 2d 343, 351 (1972)
(public has no right to trespass on private uplands to
exercise public water use rights); Buffalo River 
Construction and Recreation Council v. National Park 
Service, 558 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1977) (fishermen may
only carry their boats onto private upland to get around
obstacles in the river and may tie their boats to the
-6-
bank while fishing; riparian landowners can fence off
their shorelines to avoid trespasses but can not obstruct
the river); Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d
1015 (1956) (injunction to prevent trespass to littoral
fast lands by users of lake surface issued); Monroe Mill 
Co. v. Menzel, 35 Wash. 487, 77 P. 813 (1904) (right to
trespass on banks to break jams of shingle bolts
rejected). Cf. Botton v. State, 69 Wash. 2d 751, 420
P.2d 352 (1966) (state as littoral owner has duty to
prevent its licensees from trespassing for picnicing and
other purposes on others' littoral fast lands). But cf.
Elder v. Delcour, 365 Mo. 835, 269 S.W. 2d 17 (1954)
(portage over fast lands allowed). See also Johnson and
Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western 
Lakes and Streams, 7 Natural Resources J. 1, 34n.142
(1967); 1 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property 160 at 641-
42 (rev. ed. 1977); Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses 
and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to Water, in 1 Waters
and Water Rights § 37.4(a) at 213-17 (R. Clark ed. 1967);
Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable 
Waters, 1958 Wis. L. Rev. 335; Waite, The Dilemma of 
Water Recreation and a Suggested Solution, 1958 Wis. L.
Rev. 542. See generally D. Ducsik, Shoreline for the
Public (1974); National Association of Attorneys General,
Legal Issues in Beach Access (1975).
3. By way of comparison, in Sweden the public long
has had an unwritten customary right, known as
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Allemansfatt, or "all man's right," to cross private
property in order to use freshwater bodies and coastal
waters, so long as gardens are not trampled and the
public does not pass too close to any residence on the
property. See Hildreth, Coastal Land Use Control in 
Sweden, 2 Coastal Zone Mgmt. J. 1, 4 (1975).
4. In sum, none of the three state law approaches
utilized to expand public rights to use fresh waters
beyond those guaranteed by the federal navigation
servitude identified by Professors Abrams and Sax--(a)
public rights created through state prerogatives as owner
of submerged land; (b) expanded state definitions of
navigability; (c) public rights created through state
ownership of the water itself--so far have had any
significant impact on public rights to use private land
adjacent to fresh waters in which the public has
rights. See Abrams, Governmental Expansion of 
Recreational Water Use Opportunities, 59 Oregon Law
Review 159, 167-68 (1980).
5. Furthermore, a recent attempt to invoke the four
powerful theories used by the courts to create public use
and access rights in sandy beaches adjacent to ocean
waters discussed next--(1) prescription; (2) implied
dedication; (3) custom; and (4) public trust--failed in
the context of a freshwater lake in State v. Fox, 100
Idaho 140, 594 P.2d 1093 (1979) (injunction ordering
removal of seawall blocking public access to portion of
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shoreline landward of the seawall previously used by
public denied). Consistent with the dichotomy between
broadened public rights in fresh waters versus continued
respect for private property rights in adjacent lands
noted above, this same court appears to be more
sympathetic to public rights in fresh waters than in
adjacent lands. See KootiPai Environmental Alliance v. 
Panhandle Yacht Club, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983)
(public trust doctrine held applicable to fresh waters
but held not to preclude state lease of exclusive rights
in navigable waters to a yacht club); Shokal v. Dunn, 109
Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441 (1985) (public trust
considerations, e.g., impacts on alternative water uses,
vegetation, wildlife, and fish must be considered by
state water agency before granting a major water right
application). Despite the defeat for expanded public
shoreline access rights on tough facts in Fox, recent
judicial theories and legislative approaches to expanding
public ocean beach access rights are summarized next as
indicating possible future directions for the law of
public freshwater shoreline access.
II. THEORIES AND APPROACHES SUPPORTING INCREASED PUBLIC
ACCESS TO OCEAN BEACHES
A. Judicial Beach Access Theories and Their Relevance
to Shoreline Access
1. Prescription: In order to establish an access
right by prescription, a party must submit reasonably
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clear and convincing proof of open, notorious,
continuous, uninterrupted use, under a claim of right,
with the knowledge of the landowner for the prescription
(adverse possession) period. See Rendler v. Lincoln 
County, 709 P.2d 721 (Ore. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd on other 
grounds, Ore. Sup. Ct. Nov. 1986 (open and continuous use
of privately owned lands abutting a designated but long-
neglected county road had created a prescriptive easement
by which the public gained access to a neighboring beach
for recreational purposes); Pigorsh v. Fahner, 386 Mich.
508, 194 N.W.2d 343, 347 (1972) (no public prescriptive
access easement to freshwater lake was established).
Doctrine in some jurisdictions, e.g., State v. Fox, 100
Idaho 140, 594 P.2d 1093 (1979), that the general public
as distinguished from particular individuals cannot
obtain prescriptive rights and other factors usually
result in prescriptive beach access claims being linked
with implied dedication claims. See Degnan, Public 
Rights in Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription, 24
Syracuse L. Rev. 935 (1973).
2. Implied dedication: A common-law dedication of
property to the public can be proved either by showing
acquiescence of the owner in use of the land under
circumstances that negate the idea that the use is under
license or by establishing open and continuous use by the
public for the prescriptive period, Gion v. Santa Cruz, 1
Cal. 3d 29, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 465 P.2d 50 (1970), where
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the court also stated:
This intensification of land use combined
with the clear public policy in favor of
encouraging and expanding public access
to and the use of shoreline areas leads
us to the conclusion that the courts of
this state must be as receptive to a
finding of implied dedication of
shoreline areas as they are to a finding
of implied dedication of roadways.
Previously the court had not been so receptive to finding
public use and access rights in dry sand areas as
compared to roadways. City of Manhattan Beach v. 
Cortelyon, 10 Cal. 2d 653, 76 P.2d 483 (1938); Diamond 
Match co. v. Savercool, 218 Cal. 665 24 P.2d 783 (1933);
Whiteman v. City of San Diego, 184 Cal. 163, 193 P. 98
(1920); F.A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 170 Cal.
436, 150 P. 62 (1915); Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151
Cal. 254, 90 P. 532 (1907). See also State ex rel. 
Shorett V. Blue Ridge Club, Inc., 22 Wash. 2d 487, 156
P.2d 667 (1945); Note, Public Beaches: A Reevaluation, 15
San Diego L. Rev. 1241, 1254 (1978); Note, Public Access 
to Beaches, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 564, 574-75 (1970); Note,
Which Way to the Beach? Public Access to Beaches for 
Recreational Use, 29 S. Cal. L. Rev. 627 (1978).
Cases utilizing a prescription/implied dedication
approach to find public access easements across private
land adjacent to coastal waters in addition to Gion
include: County of Los Angeles v. Burke, 26 Cal. 3d 201,
161 Cal. Rptr. 742, 605 P.2d 381 (1980); Villa Nova 
Resort, Inc. v. State, 711 S.W.2d 120 (Texas Civ. App.
1986); Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Moody v. White, 593 SW. 2d 372
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979). On the facts, application of both
theories as well as the custom doctrine was rejected in a
coastal context in Department of Natural Resources v. 
Mayor and Council of Ocean City, 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630
(1975). See also Department of Natural Resources v. 
Cropper, 274 Md. 25, 332 A.2d 644 (1975), noted, 5 Bait.
L. Rev. 349 (1976); County of Orange v. Chandler-Sherman 
Corp., 54 Cal. App. 3d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1976) (on
the facts, no dedication of privately owned ocean beach
found); City of Long Beach v. Daugherty, 75 Cal. App. 3d
972, 142 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1977). Municipal documents may
also be interpreted to expressly dedicate a municipally-
owned beach to unrestricted public use irrevocably. See
Gewirtz v. Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495
(1972) (city unsuccessfully attempted to restrict use of
a public beach to city residents after 34 years of
operation without any residence requirement). See
generally Annot., Implied Acceptance, by Public Use, of 
Dedication of Beach or Shoreline Adjoining Public Waters,
24 A.L.R. 4th 294 (1983); Comment, Public or Private 
Ownership of Beaches: An Alternative to Implied 
Dedication, 18 UCLA L. Rev. 795 (1971). Regarding use of
dedication doctrine to create public water use rights,
see Bartlett v. Stalker Lake Sportsmen's Club, 283 Minn.
393, 168 N.W.2d 356 (1969); State by Burnquist v. 
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Fischer, 245 Minn. 1, 71 N.W.2d 161 (1955).
For specific freshwater shoreline locations where
previous public use can be documented over a sufficient
period of time, the prescription/implied dedication
theories can be utilized to gain judicial recognition of
irrevocable public access rights. However, those
theories' fact and location specific nature may mean that
a sufficient number of well-located public access points
to satisfy "demand" may not be realizable utilizing them
alone. The custom doctrine discussed next operates in
much more sweeping fashion to provide public access and
use rights in all beaches governed by the custom.
3. Custom: "A usage or practice of the people,
which, by common adoption and acquiescence, and by long
and unvarying habit, has become compulsory, and has
acquired the force of a law with respect to the place or
subject-matter to which it relates." Black's Law
Dictionary 461 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). The Oregon Supreme
Court applied the doctrine of custom based on historic
use by pioneer Oregonians of dry sandy beaches for
transportation to find irrevocable public rights to use
sandy coastal beaches inland to the vegetation line even
though the zone between the mean high tide line and the
vegetation line further inland was in private
ownership. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671
(1969); see Delo, The English Doctrine of Custom and 
Oregon Property Law: State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 4
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Environmental Law 383 (1974). See also Matcha v. Mattox,
711 S.W.2d 95 (Texas Civ. App. 1986) (public's rights in
the contested stretch of Galveston Island beach exist
inland to the vegetation line by virtue of public use
since time immemorial; erosion due to hurricanes has
moved vegetation line inland to the extent that
plaintiffs may be enjoined from rebuilding their home to
avoid interference with public access rights); City of 
Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla.
1974) (public customary rights to use dry sand areas
without creating any public interest in the land itself
recognized, but defendant allowed to build a 176 foot
high observation tower next to its pier because the tower
would not interfere with the public's customary use of
the beach); Note, Open Beaches in Florida: Right on 
Rhetoric, 6 U. Fla. L. Rev. 983 (1978); United States v. 
St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769 (D. St.
Thomas and St. John 1974) (defendant ordered to remove
fences that were constructed along the sides of its
property, across a beach toward the low-tide line based
on the "custom" doctrine as part of federal common law);
Washington Attorney General Opinion 1970 AGO No. 70
(concluded that custom doctrine would be applicable in
Washington state to give the public a right to the free
and unhindered use of the wet and dry sand areas of
Pacific Ocean beaches except in the Quinalt Indian
Reservation whose boundaries extend to the low-water
-14-
mark). Hawaii has used customary law to limit private
ownership of beach areas to land inland from the
vegetation line, thereby enhancing public beach access
and use. See Application of Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 440
P.2d 76 (1968); County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 Hawaii
176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872
(1974); Application of Sanborn, 57 Hawaii 585, 562 P.2d
771 (1977); Note, Hawaiian Beach Access: A Customary 
Right, 26 Hastings L.J. 823 (1975). But cf. Gillies v. 
Orienta Beach Club, 159 Misc. 675, 289 N.Y.S. 733 (1935)
(refused to accept customary usage as a basis for
claiming an easement in a private beach for bathing and
boating); State Highway Commission v. Bauman, 16 Or. App.
275, 517 P.2d 1201 (1974) (customary right of access does
not extend to sand dunes inland from the vegetation
line).
The custom doctrine would seem to be of limited
significance in the freshwater shoreline context given
the general absence (outside the Great Lakes) of wide,
continuous sandy shorelines which have been utilized as
transportation corridors or recreation areas since "time
immemorial," e.g., the days of white settlement of the
area.
4. Public trust: Of the four theories recently used
to expand public ocean beach access rights, the public
trust doctrine holds the greatest potential for expanded
public access rights to freshwater shorelines. The
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basics of the doctrine are reviewed in another paper
presented at this conference, so they will not be
repeated here.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has used the public
trust doctrine aggressively to expand public beach access
rights. For example, in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement 
Association, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 821 (1984), that court traced the development of the
public trust doctrine from the time of Justinian through
current New Jersey jurisprudence. Building on its 1972
decision in Borough of Neptune City V. Borough of Avon-
By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972), where it
extended the public trust doctrine to recreational uses
such as swimming and held that the doctrine applied to a
municipally-owned dry sand beach immediately landward of
the high-water mark, the Matthews court found a public
right of access to a dry sand area owned and controlled
by a "quasi-public body," the Bay Head Improvement
Association whose membership was limited to Bay Head
residents. In Neptune the court used the doctrine to
invalidate a law under which an ocean front municipality
charged higher fees to non-residents for use of
municipally-owned beaches.
5. Potential for expansion of public trust to
freshwater shorelines: Previous to Matthews, the New
Jersey court had stated that its approach was limited to
"municipally-owned open beaches. We are not called upon
-16-
to deal with beaches on which permanent improvements may
have been built, or beaches as to which a claim of
private ownership is asserted." Van Ness v. Borough of 
Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571, 573 (1978). But the
beach at issue in Matthews, owned by an association of
residents, could just as easily have been described as
quasi-private as quasi-public, yet the court was willing
to extend the public trust doctrine to it. A broad
interpretation of the Matthews holding that the public
trust doctrine gives the public rights to reasonably use
upland areas where such use is essential or reasonably
necessary for the public's enjoyment of the ocean would
seem to be equally applicable in many freshwater
shoreline situations. Freshwater shorelines owned or
managed by homeowners' associations would seem to fall
squarely within the Matthews ruling. Cf. Hitchings v. 
Del Rio Woods Park & Recreation District, 55 Cal. App. 3d
560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976) (association of homeowners
within riverside park district also named as defendant in
suit to obtain public access rights).
New Jersey's lower courts have used the above
principles to open up municipally-owned beach walkways,
toilets, and other facilities located on uplands adjacent
to public beaches to non-residents on a basis equal to
municipal residents. Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst,
148 N.J. Super. 437, 373 A.2d 1133 (1977) (non-residents
have right to use municipally owned toilet facilities but
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not changing facilities); Sea Watch, Inc. v. Borough of 
Manasquan, 425 A.2d 1098 (1980). See also Brindley v. 
Borough of Laballette, 33 N.J. Super. 344, 110 A.2d 157
(1954) (by maintaining a boardwalk, pavilions, and
bathing facilities, Borough acquired a public easement
for recreational purposes); Note, Non-Resident 
Restrictions in Municipally Owned Beaches: Approaches to 
the Problem, 10 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prov. 177 (1973-74).
These cases suggest approaches to situations where
publicly-owned freshwater shoreline facilities are
limited to special district, city, county, or state
residents or non-residents are charged higher fees for
use of the facilities than non-residents. See City of 
Madison v. Tolzmann, 71 Wis. 2d 570, 97 N.W•2d 513
(1959); Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Park & Recreation
District, 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976)
(public may use beach and parking lot owned by park
district adjacent to recreationally navigable stream).
However, to date, most applications of the public
trust doctrine in the freshwater context have been
limited to the beds, e.g., Kootenai Environmental 
Alliance, Inc. v. Pan Handle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho
622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983) (opinion reviews the public
trust law of several states), and more recently to
diversions of the waters overhead, e.g., National Audubon 
Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d
419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709, cert. denied, 104
-18-
S. Ct. 413 (1983) (the Mono Lake case); Robinson v. 
Arivoshi, 658 P.2d 287 (Sup. Ct. Ha. 1982); Shokal v. 
Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441 (1985); United 
Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Water 
Conservation Commission, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976), of
"navigable" rivers and lakes and their tributaries,
without any upland extensions as in New Jersey. See
Idaho v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 594 P.2d 1093 (1979)
(application of public trust doctrine to privately owned
but publicly used land adjacent to navigable lake
rejected).
The freshwater public trust cases most indicative of
further evolution inland are the California "shorezone"
cases. In State v. Superior Court of Lake County (Lyon).
29 Cal. 3d 210, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 625 P.2d 239 (1981),
a shoreline owner sued the state to quiet title to a
marsh located landward of the low-water mark on a
navigable lake. The landowner relied upon an 1870
statute which stated that grants of land bordering on
navigable waters where there is no tide extend to the
low-water mark. While recognizing the ownership claim,
the court also held that the land between the lake's high
and low-water marks (the "shorezone") is subject to the
public trust doctrine analogous to coastal tidelands
which have been conveyed into private ownership without
any clear expression of legislative intent to free them
from the public trust doctrine. See City of Berkeley v. 
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Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
According to the court in Lyon, its decision
affected no "less than 4,000 miles of shoreline along 34
navigable lakes and 31 navigable rivers." See also State 
v. Superior Court of Placer County (Fogerty), 29 Cal. 3d
240, 625 P.2d 255, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1981) (public
trust doctrine applies to privately-owned lake shoreline
below dam-caused artificial high-water mark where
inundation has occurred for the prescriptive period);
Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232
(1969) (owner of shoreline below dam-caused high-water
mark must remove fill below such high-water mark and
cannot otherwise interfere with public water use while
the land is submerged, but when the land is not submerged
trespasses may be prevented); West v. Slick, 326 S.E.2d
601 (N.C. 1985) (the public has a right to pass
unobstructed along the "foreshore," the strip of land
lying between high- and low-water mark, which is state
property); Note, Lyon and Fogerty: Unprecedented 
Extensions of the Public Trust, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1138
(1982).
Also suggestive of eventual application of the
public trust doctrine to freshwater shorelines in
compelling circumstances are the cases recognizing
superior public rights in navigable waterways and
adjacent wetlands vis-a-vis shoreline owners requesting
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state permission to exercise their riparian rights to
place fill or construct wharfs, docks, or other
facilities in those waters and wetlands. See, e.g.,
Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Board, 485 A.2d 287
(N.H. 1984) (fill permit refused); Graham v. Edwards, 472
So.2d 803 (Fla. App. 1985) (construction of private dock
prohibited); In re Application of Cert. Baptist Theo. 
Sem., 370 N.W. 642 (Minn. App. 1985) (permit to construct
radio tower in public wetlands denied); Poneleit v. 
Dudas, 141 Conn. 413, 106 A.2d 479 (1954) (use of
riparian land for marina purposes may be prohibited by
city zoning ordinance); Welsh v. City of Orono, 355
N.W.2d 117 (Minn. 1984) (municipality may regulate wharfs
and docks in shoreland areas but not dredging of "public
waters"); Capune v. Robbins, 273 N.C. 581, 160 S.E.2d 881
(1968) (ocean beach owner who has exercised his littoral
rights by constructing a pier into deeper ocean waters
cannot interfere with public use of the ocean waters
beneath the pier). See also Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, 
Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d
513 (1970); Henry Dalton & Sons Co. v. Oakland, 168 Cal.
463, 143 P. 721 (1914) (riparian's access to navigable
waters may be cut off by public seawall on tidelands
without compensation); Carpenter v. City of Santa Monica,
147 P.2d 964 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944), Los Angeles Athletic 
Club v. City of Santa Monica, 147 P.2d 976 (Cal. 1944),
Miramar Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 23 Ca1.2d 170, 143
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P.2d 1 (1943) and Faty v. Town of Palm Beach, 29 So.2d
363 (Fla. 1947) (cities may build breakwaters and groins
blocking the accretion of sand on private beaches without
liability); West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 511 P.2d 1326
(1973) (public right to use navigable lake did not
include right to "permanently" connect houseboat to shore
with a catwalk interfering with shoreline owners littoral
rights); Burns v. Forbes, 412 F.2d 995 (3rd Cir. 1969)
(filling of mangrove swamp adjacent to tidal lagoon as
exercise of littoral rights); Plager, Interference with 
Public Right of Navigation and the Riparian Owner's Claim 
of Privilege, 33 Mo. L. Rev. 608 (1968).
6. Limits on the public trust doctrine as a
freshwater shoreline access solution: Even if extended in
appropriate contexts to freshwater shorelines above the
ordinary high-water mark, the public trust doctrine
cannot be viewed as an all encompassing solution to
freshwater shoreline access problems for the following
reasons:
a. Where the bed of the freshwater body is
privately owned under the navigable-at-statehood-for-
title-purposes test but the water surface is subject to a
public use right under the recreational navigability
rule, e.g., Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238
P.2d 128 (1951) (levee failure created recreationally
navigable waters over privately owned bed), subjecting
the privately owned shoreline adjacent to the privately
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owned bed to a public access right pursuant to the public
trust doctrine would be difficult to rationalize
doctrinely, and would raise particularly difficult taking
issues. However, the extension of the public trust
doctrine to water diverted from nonnavigable tributaries
of navigable freshwater bodies in the Mono Lake case, see
Note, The Public Trust Doctrine As a Source of State 
Reserved Water Rights, 63 Denver L. Rev. 585n.* (1986),
illustrates that those difficulties might not be
insurmountable.
b. Even the New Jersey Supreme Court in its
landmark Matthews decision discussed above, did not
extend public use and access rights to all sandy beaches
adjacent to ocean beds and waters subject to the public
trust doctrine, but instead limited such public rights to
locations "where use of the dry sand is essential for
reasonably necessary enjoyment of the ocean" such that
the public trust doctrine "warrants the public's use of
the upland dry sand area subject to an accommodation of
the interests of the owner." Under this approach
applications of the public trust doctrine to freshwater
shorelines would be limited to locations where public use
of the shoreline was essential for access and ue of the
water body, and even in those locations, as the court
also stated "the particular circumstances must be
considered and examined before arriving at a solution
that will accommodate the public's right and the private
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interests involved," suggesting that where a reasonable
accommodation of the private interests with public use
cannot be made, e.g., by confining public use and access
with signs and fences to particular areas, the doctrine
will not be applied to create public shoreline use
rights.
c. Depending on how far inland the nearest public
road is, application of the public trust doctrine to
freshwater shorelines may not solve the so called
"vertical" access problem of getting the public lawfully
from the nearest public road (with available parking
space) through intervening private property to the
shoreline subjected to expanded public use rights under
the Matthews approach.
B. Regulatory Approaches for Creating and Protecting
Public Beach and Shoreline Access
1. Many coastal state legislatures have created
state beach access regulatory programs implementing the
judicial decisions just discussed, and the courts in turn
generally have supported agency implementation of the
legislation:
a. Pursuant to the "Oregon Beach Bill," ORS
390.605 et. seq., the vegetation line along sandy
portions of the Oregon coast was surveyed, public use
rights declared to extend inland to the vegetation line,
and a permit required for all construction seaward of the
vegetation line. The Oregon Supreme Court has supported
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both the public use and construction permit aspects of
that legislation. See Hay v. Dept. of Transportation,
301 Or. 129, 719 P.2d 860 (1986) (state agency regulation
authorizing public parking on the sand in front of the
appellant's beach-front motel upheld); State Highway 
Commission v. Fultz, 261 Or. 289, 491 P.2d 1171 (1971)
(denial of permit to build a road on an ocean beach
upheld on the basis of interference with public use of
the dry sand area). See also McDonald v. Halvorson, No.
A-85-05-05317 (Multnomah County Cir. Ct. 1986) (public
rights established by Thornton v. Hay to use all dry sand
areas between the mean high-tide and vegetation line
encompasses beach areas not expressly designated for
public use by the "Oregon Beach Bill" because the
legislature in enacting the bill did not intend, and
could not even if it wanted to, diminish those judicially
established rights).
b. The Texas Open Beaches Act, Tex. Nat. Res. Code
tit. 2 §§ 61.001-.024 provides that the public shall have
access to state-owned beaches and other beaches where the
public has acquired access rights by prescription,
dedication, "or has retained a right by virtue of
continued right in the public" and these rights extend
inland to the vegetation line. Texas court decisions
utilizing the legislation to support findings of public
access rights include the Villa Nova Resort, Inc., Seaway 
Company, Moody, and Matcha cases cited above.
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c. See also Atlantis I Condominium Association v. 
Bryson, 403 A.2d 711 (Del. 1979) (Delaware Beach
Preservation Act of 1972 which regulates construction on
private beaches upheld as a constitutional delegation of
legislative power); Piekarski v. State, 373 A.2d 209
(Del. 1977) (order granting state agency permanent
easement to place fill protecting a beach upheld); United 
States v. Kane, 602 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'g 461 F.
Supp. 554 (E.D.M.Y. 1978) (Corps of Engineers sought
removal of two fences extending 40 feet below the mean
high-tide line which interfered with the public beach and
tidelands use); Ha. Rev. Stat. §S 205-31 through 205-37
(shoreline development setback requirements); N.C. Gen.
Stat. SS 113 A-134.1 to 113 A-134.3 (state program for
acquiring, improving, and maintaining beach access ways);
D. Brower, Access to the Nation's Beaches: Legal and
Planning Perspectives (1978); Maloney, Fernandez, &
Parrish, Public Beach Access: A Guaranteed Place to 
Spread Your Towel, 29 Fla. L. Rev. 853 (1977); Note,
Coastal Recreation: Legal Methods for Securing Rights in 
the Seashore, 33 Me. L. Rev. 69 (1981); D. Owens & D.
Brower, Public Use of Coastal Beaches (1976); Symposium,
Beach Access, 5 Coastal Zone Mgmt. J. No. 1/2 (1979).
d. However, the legislative reaction to judicial
decisions expanding public beach access rights has not
always been supportive of public access. See, e.g.,
California Civil Code §S 813, 1009 discussed in
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Gallagher, Juke & Agnew, Implied Dedication: The 
Imaginary waves of Gion-Dietz, 5 Sw. U.L. Rev. 48, 79-80
(1973), providing private upland owners through recording
documents and other devices to protect themselves from
implied dedication of access rights to the public.
Similarly, one reason given for Illinois' withdrawal from
the federal coastal zone management program was the
opposition to increased public access to the lakeshore
near private residential areas.
e. Furthermore, the courts generally have been
supportive of local, state, and federal agency
restrictions on public beach use so long as they apply
equally to all members of the public. See, e.g., the
cases upholding vehicle beach usage regulations: City of 
Daytona Beach Shores v. Florida, 483 So. 2d 405 (Fla.
Sup. Ct. 1985) (public trust doctrine not violated by
city charging reasonable fees for vehicle access to beach
land held in trust for the public by the state where the
fees were to be used for maintenance and other beach-
related purposes); Lighthouse Shores, Inc. v. Town of 
Islip, 41 N.Y.2d 7, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 359 M.E. 2d 337
(1976); People v. Deacon, 87 C.A. 2d Supp. 29, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 277 (1978); Sim v. State Parks and Recreation 
Commission, 94 Wash. 2d 552, 617 P.2d 1028 (1980); the
cases upholding local restrictions on surfing in coastal
waters: MacDonald v. Newsome, 437 F. Supp. 796 (D.N.C.
1977); State v. Zetteerberg, 109 N.H. 126, 244 A.2d 188
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(1968); and a case upholding an Interior Department ban
on public nude bathing at a remove beach within the Cape
Cod National Seashore: Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp.
122 (D. Mass. 1975). See also Ore. Admin. Rules 736-24-
030, -035, -040 restricting motor vehicle and aircraft
usage of significant stretches of Oregon coastal beaches.
f. The best known, most frequently applied, and
most often challenged state regulatory program supporting
public access to beaches is administered by the
California Coastal Commission. The California Coastal
Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 30000-900, sets forth
circumstances in which the Commission must require
landowners to dedicate easements for public beach access
as a condition of obtaining a coastal development
permit. A dedication does not become effective until a
public agency or "private" (non-profit) association
assumes liability and maintenance responsibilities for
the accessway. Id. 5 30212(a). This regulatory program
is discussed further in connection with the taking issue.
III. THE CALIFORNIA BEACH ACCESS PROGRAM AND THE TAKING
ISSUE
A. The California Courts Generally Have Supported
Public Beach Access Dedication Permit Conditions Imposed
by the California Coastal Commission (CCC) Pursuant to
the California Coastal Act: See Frisco Land & Mining Co. 
v. State of Cal., 74 Cal. App. 3d 736, 753, 754, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 820 (1977); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Cal. Coastal 
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Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 678, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1982);
Grupe v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212
Cal. Rptr., 578 (1985) (conditioning single family home
construction permit on public dedication of two-thirds of
lot seaward of retaining wall is not a taking); Liberty 
v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1980) (access dedication challenged as not
supported by subdivision dedication theories); Pacific 
Legal Foundation v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 129 Cal. App. 3d
44, 180 Cal. Rptr. 858, vacated, 33 Cal. 3d 158, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 655 P.2d 306 (1982) (general challenge by
public interest group to Commission's beach access
guidelines not ripe); Whalers' Village Club v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 220 Cal. Rptr. 2
(1985) (access dedication required for revetment
construction). See also McCarthy v. Manhattan Beach, 41
Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
817 (1954) (zoning ordinance prohibiting construction on
privately-owned beach upheld as reasonable); Mackall v. 
White, 85 A.D.2d 696, 445 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1981), rev.
denied, 450 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1982) (subdivision approval
could not be conditioned upon dedication of public
beachfront access).
B. Three Previous Attempts By Disappointed Developers
to Obtain United States Supreme Court Review of CCC
Access Requirements Were Unsuccessful: See Oceanic Cal., 
Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App.
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3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951
(1977) (Sea Ranch dispute); Remmenqa v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm'n, 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628, appeal 
dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 241 (1985) (no taking or denial of
equal protection); Sea Ranch Ass'n v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm'n, 396 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Cal. 1975), remanded, 537
F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1976), redecided, 527 F. Supp. 390
(N.D. Cal.), vacated for possible mootness, 454 U.S. 1070
(1981) (based on Cal. Pub. Res. Code S 30610.6), 552 F.
Supp. 241 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
C. In October 1986 the Court Granted Review in Nollan 
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223
Cal. Rptr. 28, juris. noted, 55 USLW 3277 (No. 86-133
Oct. 20, 1986), argued March 30, 1987, Where the CCC
Required Dedication of the One-Third of a Beachfront Lot
Seaward of an Existing Seawall as a Permit Condition for
Demolishing a Small Vacation Cottage and Replacing It
With a Larger Substantial Year-Around Home. The Nollans'
home was one of twenty-nine located between two public
beaches, "one more brick in the wall separating the
People of California from the state's tidelands," in the
language of Grupe, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
1. Nollan's facts involve access to beaches near
private seawalls like Whalers' Village, the Fox
freshwater shoreline case discussed earlier, and Grupe,
but are less harsh than Grupe, except that the proposed
single-family home was more modest in Nollan and replaced
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a small vacation cottage.
2. Nollan's issues are much like Grupe, Liberty, and
Remmenqa where the Court recently denied review, except
instead of wealthy lot owners in an exclusive subdivision
as in Remmenqa, Nollan involved a "little guy" single-
family homeowner who wanted to replace his vacation
cottage with a year-around home.
3. Nollan has been argued as a subdivision exaction
case rather than a beach/shoreline access case, i.e., the
question is whether mandatory access dedications fall
within or without the scope of reasonable exactions from
developers; if outside, then requiring access is a
taking. See J. Botzum & D. Garner, eds., 18 Coastal Zone
Management Newsletter No. 13 at 1-6 (Nautilus Press April
2, 1987).
a. Based on Associated Homebuilders v. City of 
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, appeal dis., 404 U.S. 878
(1971), the California Courts of Appeal in Nollan, Grupe,
and Remmenqa held that the particular development from
which public access is exacted need not have directly
caused the access problem being solved or even benefit
from the access exacted; there need be only an indirect
relationship between the exaction and the need for public
access to which the development cumulatively
contributes. Grupe, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
b. Generally, the costs of exactions to the
developer may be viewed as offset by value enhancements
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due to the development's approval and the provision of
public services, and a taking challenge defeated. See
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 73-74
(1964). The court in Grupe acknowledged that beachfront
lot owners like the Nollans required to dedicate access
are not also receiving new public services, but are
receiving "a substantial benefit by being allowed to . .
[develop the property] and to thereby greatly increase
its value. The benefit involved is that the development
is permitted on the coast--an extremely limited resource
--in exchange for provisions to ensure maximum public
access to, and use of, the tidelands." 212 Cal. Rptr. at
596-97.
c. The California Coastal Act's mandatory access
dedication approach implements the state constitutional
mandate (Cal. Const. Art. X, § 4 quoted above) for public
access to public trust resources, i.e., navigable waters
and their beds. Thus it can be argued that no nexus is
required between the development's burdens on access and
the access exacted because the exaction is imposed in
recognition of established public rights not to make the
development pay its own way. See Note, Public Beach 
Access Exactions: Extending the Public Trust Doctrine to 
Vindicate Public Rights, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1049, 1079
(1981). See also Note, Public Access to Beaches: Common 
Law Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 369, 374 (1973); Comment, California Beach Access: 
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The Mexican Law and the Public Trust, 2 Ecology L.Q. 571
(1972).
d. More restrictive standards have been applied
to development exactions by other state courts, but the
U.S. Supreme Court has denied review in the exaction
cases presented to it. See D. Hagman & J. Juergensmeyer,
Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law 207n.24,
208n.32 (2d ed. 1986); Symposium, Exactions, 50 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 1 (1987).
e. Thus Nollan could be the Court's first
substantive review of development exactions; perhaps more
likely, the Court will treat Nollan more generally as
another taking challenge to land use regulations, an area
where the Court recently has been avoiding the taking
issue based on lack of ripeness but continuing to grant
review. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, (No. B003702 Cal. App., 2d Dist.,
June 25, 1985), U.S. Sup. Ct. juris. noted,
(challenge to county ordinance prohibiting structures in
floodplains); MacDonald, Somers, & Frates v. Yolo County,
54 USLW 4782 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985),
noted, 13 Ecology L.Q. 625. However, Nollan may be
difficult to dodge based on ripeness, as it seems
whatever redevelopment proposal the Nollans present to
the CCC, the California Coastal Act requires an access
dedication. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30212(a) ("public
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access . . . along the coast shall be provided in new
development projects").
4. The California Court of Appeal held that although
the public access condition caused a diminution in value,
"it did not deprive the Nollans of reasonable use of the
property," 223 Cal. Rptr. at 30, and therefore was not a
taking.
D. From the Beginning, Some Commentators Have
Criticized the Judicial Theories and Legislative
Approaches Utilized to Expand Public Ocean Beach Access
Rights as Takings, but the Cases So Holding are Few. See
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. Sup. Ct.
1974) (state statute expanding public fishing and
navigation rights with respect to tidelands to include an
on-foot right-of-passage held a taking; similar Maine
legislation is being challenged as a taking in the Maine
Courts); Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473
(D. Ha. 1978) (state court decision holding property
seaward of vegetation line publicly owned is a taking);
Justice Stewart concurring in Hughes v. Washington, 389
U.S. 290 (1967) (sudden judicial changes in the rules
governing ownership of beachfront accretion may
constitute a taking). But see Hay v. Bruno, 344 F. Supp.
286 (D. Or. 1972) (Oregon statutes confirming public
customary rights along the ocean shore held not a
taking). See generally Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last--At 
Least They Lose Their Property: Gion v. City of Santa 
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Cruz, 8 Cal. W.L. Rev. 75 (1971); Comment, Public Access 
and the California Coastal Commission: A Question of 
Overreaching, 21 Santa Clara L. Rev. 395 (1981); Note,
This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication 
and Its Application to California Beaches, 44 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1092 (1971); Note, Assault on the Beaches: "Taking" 
Public Recreational Rights to Private Property, 60 B.U.L.
Rev. 933 (1980); Comment, Who Owns the Beach? 
Massachusetts Refuses to Join the Trend of Increasing 
Public Access, 11 Urb. L. Ann. 283 (1976); Nixon, Public 
Access to the Shoreline: The Rhode Island Example, 4
Coastal Zone Mgmt. J. 65 (1978); Note, Colonial Patents 
and Open Beaches, 2 Hofstra L. Rev. 301 (1974).
Certainly the beach access cases and implementing
legislation appear to have redistributed wealth from
beachfront landowners to the public. See Roberts,
Beaches: The Efficiency of the Common Law and Other Fairy 
Tales, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 169, 180n.64 (1980). However,
that redistribution does not appear to constitute a
taking under current Supreme Court taking jurisprudence.
E. The California Court's "Reasonable Use" Approach to
Taking Issues Has Firm Support in U.S. Supreme Court
Taking Jurisprudence, e.g., Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (historic
landmark designation which interfered with redevelopment
options held not a taking). See also U.S. v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455, 459n.4 (1985) (Corps
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of Engineers' denial of permit to fill privately-owned
wetlands may constitute a taking only "if its effect on a
landowner's ability to put his property to productive use
is sufficiently severe").
F. Nor Does the CCC Appear to Have Run Afoul of the
Court's Sometime Sensitivity to "Investment-Backed
Expectations," e.g., Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 100
S. Ct. 383 (1979). Unlike the Corps of Engineers in
Kaiser-Aetna, the CCC in Nollan did not first permit
development at the location without a public access
condition and then later try to impose a public access
condition on a subsequent permit requested at the same
location. Cf. County of Los Angeles v. Berk, 26 Cal. 3d
201, 161 Cal. Rptr. 742, 605 P.2d 381 (1980) (local
government permit denial based on previously unasserted
implied beach access dedications upheld).
G. Given the Demonstrated Need For Public Beach and
Shoreline Access, the Balancing of Public Benefits
Against Private Losses That the Court Frequently Engages
in Supports Access Exactions Against a Taking Challenge,
and Suggests That the Goal in Each Access Situation Ought
to be an Appropriate Accommodation of Public and Private
Interests as Discussed Further Below. See Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
124-25 (1978).
H. Only If the Court Views the Resulting Public Use as
a "Physical Invasion" of the Property by Government Would
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Precedent Suggest Treating Access Exactions as a
Taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (statute providing that
landlords may not interfere with the installation of
cable TV facilities serving tenants treated as a physical
invasion and held a taking).
I. Lost in the Furor Over Public Access to Ocean
Beaches Has Been the Question of Public Access to Lands
Above the Mean-High Tideline Adjacent to Tidal Bays and
Estuaries.
1. The judicial theories supporting public ocean
beach access generally do not apply to privately-owned
uplands adjacent to bays and estuaries due to the absence
of facts supporting the prescription, implied dedication,
and custom theories. Thus the shores of bays and
estuaries are similar to freshwater shorelines with
respect to public access rights. Because the beds of
bays and estuaries below mean-high tideline generally are
publicly-owned public trust lands like the beds of
navigable freshwater lakes and rivers, the public trust
doctrine combined with regulatory and other approaches
which accommodate public and private interests in
freshwater shorelines discussed below will be quite
helpful in expanding public access to the shores of tidal
bays and estuaries as well.
2. Special attention to bay and estuary access is
needed in tie Pacific Northwest where the relative lack
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of public access to the shores of Puget Sound and bays
and estuaries along the coasts of Washington and Oregon
compares quite unfavorably with the extensive public
access to ocean beaches. However, a 1984 proposal to
include an access dedication provision for new
development along the shores of Oregon estuaries in
amendments to Oregon Statewide Land Use Goal 17, the
Shorelands Goal, was rejected. See also former Cal. Bus.
& Prof. Code § 11610.5, repealed by 1974 Cal. Stats., ch.
1536, § 4 (subdivision maps for bay shores must include
public access to high-water mark); Henderson, The Bay and 
Estuaries Section of the 1985 Texas Water Bill: Drowning 
the Public Trust Doctrine, 23 Houston L. Rev. 907 (1986).
3. An outstanding bayshore access program which also
serves as a model for freshwater shorelines is operated
by the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development
Commission using a combination of new development access
dedications, acquisitions of access rights, and
negotiations with bayshore landowners such as the
Department of Defense to provide public access wherever
possible and appropriate to shorelands to which the
public previously was denied access unnecessarily.
IV. ACCOMMODATING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS IN
FRESHWATER SHORELINES
A. Building on Traditional Accommodations
1. The Massachusetts Bay Colony Ordinance of 1641-47
provided for public access and use of the colony's bays,
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coves, and rivers so far as the sea ebbed and flowed, and
of freshwater "great ponds" more than ten acres in
size. It also authorized passage across intervening
private lands to those waters so long as cornfields and
meadows were not trespassed upon. Subsequently, this
passage right was limited to the crossing of unimproved
or unenclosed lands and held inapplicable where some
other convenient means of access was available. C.
Meyers & D. Tarlock, Water Resource Management, 1074 (2d
ed. 1980); see Leighty, Public Rights in Navigable State 
Waters--Some Statutory Approaches, 6 Land & Water L. Rev.
459, 471-72 (1971).
2. The cases involving claims of public recreational
water use rights are built on the assumption that lawful
access to the water is available. See, e.g., Montana 
Coalition v. Hildreth, People v. Emmert, Pigorsh v. 
Fahner, and State v. McIlroy cited above and Nakoosa-
Edwards Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 201 Wis. 40, 46-47,
228 N.W. 144, 147, 229 N.W. 631 (1930).
3. Where sufficient access is not available to
popular waterways, the states traditionally have either
purchased or condemned riparian land for public access.
See Peck v. Olsen Construction Co., 216 Iowa 519, 245
N.W. 131 (1932) (Iowa Code Ann § 107.24 interpreted to
authorize state condemnation of access ways to any waters
overlying private beds entirely surrounded by private
property); Stony Ridge and Carlos View Terrace Ass'n. v. 
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Alexander, 353 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. App. 1984) (agency use
of Minn. Stat. Ann. § 86A.05, subd. 9(b) to acquire
access upheld over objection of riparians); Branch v. 
°canto County, 13 Wis. 2d 595, 109 N.W.2d 105 (1961)
(condemnation to create public access to lake surrounded
by property of one landowner upheld under Wis. Stats.
23.09(14)); Salisbury Land & Imp. Co. v. Commonwealth,
215 Mass. 371, 102 N.E. 619 (1913) (condemnation for
public beach and bathing house). See also State v. 
Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 63 N.W.2d 278 (1954) (statute
permitting condemnation of access to "public waters" held
inapplicable to private non-navigable waters).
4. If public water use encouraged and made possible
by the state as riparian landowner unreasonably
interferes with other riparians' enjoyment of the water
body, the courts may require the state to impose and
enforce suitable regulations on public use. See Botton 
v. State, 69 Wn.2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966).
5. In recent opinions expanding public rights based
on the public trust doctrine, the courts have been
sensitive to their decisions' effects on upland owners'
investments in improvements. See City of Berkeley, Lyon,
and Fogerty supra; Cal. Pub. Res. Code S 6312; O'Neill v. 
State Highway Department, 50 N.J. 307, 235 A.2d 1, 8-9
(1967).
6. In addition, the cases upholding non-
discriminatory governmental charges for public access to
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public beaches and waters could be extended to authorize
private upland owners subjected to public access
requirements to collect reasonable fees to reflect the
cost of access to them including reductions in property
value. See City of Daytona Beach Shores and Borough of 
Neptune City supra. Private collection of access fees
would seem particularly appropriate where access
dedication is required as a condition of shoreline
development permission and the enhanced property values
created by the grant of development permission do not
outweigh the cost to the shoreline developer of the
required access dedication. However, rather than
collecting fees, many shoreline developers probably would
prefer that the effectiveness of any dedication exacted
be conditioned on the assumption by a public agency or
non-profit association of liability and maintenance
responsibilities as under the California Coastal Act.
7. The need for shoreline development regulatory
programs which provide the opportunity to exact access
dedications is illustrated by the cases involving overuse
of the water body created by the failure of private or
public riparians to adequately control the activities of
the public permitted to utilize the riparian land to gain
access to the water body. See Botton supra; Snively v. 
Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956), annotated 
57 A.L.R. 2d 560; Thompson V. Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 154
N.W.2d 473 (1967), on appeal after remand, 385 Mich. 103,
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188 N.W.2d 579 (1971); Pierce v. Riley, 35 Mich. App.
122, 192 N.W.2d 366 (1971) (66 percent increase in lake
access due to riparian's canal construction enjoined as
unreasonable); Bartke & Patton, Water Based Recreational 
Developments in Michigan--Problems of Developers, 25
Wayne L. Rev. 1005 (1979); Symposium on Access to 
Waterways, 16 U.C.D.L. Rev. 573 (1983). Obviously, if
the water body already is overused, further access to it
should not be created by mandatory access dedication or
otherwise until the conditions resulting in overuse are
corrected.
8. If portions of a particular undeveloped shoreline
are more valuable for purposes such as wetlands
preservation and riparian vegetation protection
inconsistent with intensive public use and access, then
any public access conditions imposed on development of
the remainder of the parcel should be shaped
accordingly. On the other hand, intensive public use may
be consistent with the public and private interest in
avoiding damage from flooding and erosion which results
in a particular shoreline remaining undeveloped.
9. Accommodating public access seems especially
appropriate for shoreline owners who also benefit by
diverting water from the water body, especially in those
western states including Colorado where prior
appropriators are allowed to trespass in order to perfect
their water rights. See J. Laitos, Natural Resources Law
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538-39 (West 1985). See also Boz-Lew Builders v. Smith,
571 P.2d 389 (Mont. 1977). Of course public shoreline
access should not be allowed in locations where it would
actually interfere with the diversion or the beneficial
uses such as crop irrigation and domestic water supply
for which the diversion is made, or expose the public to
undue hazard from those activities.
10. Most beachfront and shoreline landowners
adjacent to navigable waters face continuing uncertainty
as to the exact location at any point in time of the
boundary (mean high tide line or ordinary high water
mark) between their parcels and the publicly-owned bed of
the navigable waterway. See Hildreth, Coastal Natural 
Hazards Management, 59 Ore. L. Rev. 201, 204 (1981);
Maloney, The Ordinary High Water Mark: Attempts At 
Settling An Unsettled Boundary Line, 13 Land and Water L.
Rev. 465 (1978); Maloney & Ausness, The Use and Legal 
Significance of the Mean High Water Line in Coastal 
Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 185 (1974); Note,
Florida's Sovereignty Submerged Lands: What Are They, Who 
Runs Them, and Where Is the Boundary?, 1 Fla. St. U.L.
Rev. 596 (1973); Washburn, The Federal Navigational 
Servitude and the California Public Trust for Commerce, 
Navigation, and Fishing: An Overview of Federal and State 
Legislative Schemes Identifying Land Subject to These 
Navigational Servitudes, 13 Western State U. L. Rev. 525
(1986); Washburn, The Riparian Developer's Dilemma: 
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Locating the Boundary of Navigable Lakes and Rivers, 18
Real. Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 538 (1983); Cabaness, Federal 
Common Law and Its Application to Disputes Involving 
Accretive and Avulsive Changes in the Bounds of Navigable 
Water, 17 Land & Water L. Rev. 329 (1982); Wilson,
Ownership of Mineral Interests Underlying Inland Bodies 
of Water and the Effects of Accretion and Erosion, 30
Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 14-1 (1984). The uncertainty
arises from the rules in effect in most states and under
federal common law that the boundary is ambulatory, i.e,
it wanders due to gradual changes in the shoreline from
accretion and erosion which alter the location of the
mean high tide line or ordinary high-water mark. See,
e.g., California v. U.S., 86 L.A.D.J. DAR 4006 (9th Cir.
No. 85-1965 Dec. 2, 1986) (federal law governs and
federal government owns the land exposed by the receding
waters of Mono Lake); Lake Providence Port Commission v. 
Bunge Corp., 193 So.2d 363 (1966) (freshwater
shorelines); Kruse v. Grokap, 349 So.2d 788 (Fla. App.
1977); Wilt v. Endicott, 68 Or. App. 481, 684 P.2d 595
(1984) (freshwater shorelines). Cf. Beach Colony II v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 199 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1984) (boundary
not affected by "avulsive" (sudden) changes in
shoreline); Louisiana Civil Code, Art. 501 (saltwater
boundary changes with erosion but not with accretion).
See also State v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725 (Ha. 1977)
(additional shoreline created by volcanic lava flow
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belongs to the state and is subject to the public trust
doctrine). However, stabilization of the shoreline by
artificial means, e.g., seawall construction, freezes the
boundary both in law and in fact, at least so long as the
stabilization device works. See In re Pt. Lookout, Town 
of Hempstead, 144 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1954). This physical and
legal boundary stability enhances the development
potential of the property but stabilization devices can
increase erosion of neighboring private and public lands
thereby reducing public recreational opportunities. Thus
when development permission is granted for the stabilized
parcel, it does not seem unfair for a regulatory agency
such as the California coastal Commission to require
dedication to public use of the beach seaward of the
seawall as in the Nollan case in return for the enhanced
development opportunity which was created at some risk to
nearby recreational opportunities.
11. Furthermore, the trend in coastal law and policy
is to treat landowner construction of seawalls to protect
beachfront property from erosion as a non-compensable
privilege rather than a property right protected from
governmental takings due to their potentially adverse
effects on adjacent private and public lands and waters
and public use of them. See Rolleston v. State, 266
S.E.2d 189 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1980) (denial of permit to build
seawall based on erosion hazards to adjacent property
held not a taking); Chapman & Hildreth, Coastal Erosion 
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Management in Australia and the U.S., 1 Coastal Zone '85
Proceedings 91, 98-102, 106n.13; Maloney & O'Donnell,
Drawing the Line at the Ocean Front: The Role of 
Construction Setback Lines in Regulating Development of 
the Coastal Zone, 30 U. Fla. L. Rev. 383 (1978). Thus
permits authorizing seawall construction conditioned upon
public access dedications represent a generally fair
accommodation of the public and private interests
involved.
B. Even If the Supreme Court Holds the Beach Access
Dedication Imposed On the Nollans A Taking, Shoreline
Property Owners Will Find Themselves Still Accommodating
the Public Interest Under a Variety of Other Regulatory
Programs Which Restrain Their Development Activities
Immediately Adjacent to Inland and Coastal Waters.
1. Wetlands protection. See Claridge v. New 
Hampshire Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984), Graham 
v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 Sos2d 1374, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981) and Moskow v. Commissioner 
of the Department of Environmental Management, 384 Mass.
530, 427 N.E.2d 750 (1981) (denial of permission to fill
privately-owned wetlands held not a taking); Ga. Code
Ann. S 45-140(a); Va. Code S 62.1-13.5. But cf. Burrows 
v. Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981) (court
distinguishes between "unique" value of saltwater marshes
and inland wetlands in holding a rezoning of land to a
"conservation zone" a taking). Another paper presented
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at this conference discusses wetlands protection in much
further detail.
2. Flood and erosion hazard protection encouraged by
the Federal Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §
4056 et. seq. Regarding erosion, see the references
cited in sections IV.A.10 and 11 above. Regarding
flooding see Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. V. Dept. of 
Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977)
(floodplain zoning held not a taking). But cf. Annicelli 
v. Town of South Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1983)
(flood hazard ordinance held unconstitutional as applied
to barrier beach parcel with no practical use under
ordinance). See generally D. Callies & R. Freilich, Land
Use 1193 (1986); D. Hagman & J. Juergensmeyer, Urban
Planning 86-88, 438-441 (2d ed. 1986); Plater, The
Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the 
Police Power, 52 Texas L. Rev. 201 (1974).
3. Riparian vegetation protection. See Dept. of 
Envtl. Req. v. Goldring, 477 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1985) (state
agency's jurisdiction over wetlands extends to aquatic
vegetation and exchange of waters (which need not be two
way) with state waters); Ore. Admin. Rules § 629-24-116
(regulation of commercial timber harvesting in riparian
zone equal to 3 times the river's width; also applies to
lake shores); Lane County Code 3§ 16.229(7), 16,2331(7),
Bellevue, WA City Code § 20.50.044, Beaverton, OR Code §
100.200 (maintenance, removal, and replacement of
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riparian vegetation).
4. For a state river bank conservation program which
combines the above three purposes with enhanced public
access, see the Willamette River Greenway established by
Oregon Statewide Land Use Goal 15, Ore. Rev. Stat. SS
390.310-.368, and Ore. Admin. Rules ch. 660, div. 20.
See generally Ore. Dept. of Land Cons. & Devel., 2 Oregon
Lands No. 6 (June 1979).
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